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MEDICAID AT THIRTY-FIVE 
SARA ROSENBAUM* AND DAVID ROUSSEAU** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This article presents a broad overview of Medicaid, the nation’s largest 
means-tested health care financing program.  In an era of health policy ferment 
(as all eras of U.S. public policy) this article is intended to give readers a sense 
of Medicaid’s place within the health system as a whole, the essential market-
transcendent functions it performs, the modernization challenges that it faces, 
and the prospects for reform.  The immediate impetus for this article was a 
symposium on Medicaid conducted in March 2000 by the Saint Louis 
University School of Law.  The observations offered here reflect years of 
ongoing discussions with many scholars who have studied Medicaid’s 
immense contributions and major shortcomings.1 
 
* Harold and Jane Hirsh Professor, Health Law and Policy, The George Washington University, 
School of Public Health and Health Services, Washington D.C.  Correspondence should be 
addressed to Professor Rosenbaum. 
** Policy Analyst, Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, The Henry J. Kaiser 
Family Foundation, Washington D.C. 
 1. Over the course of many years, Professor Rosenbaum has benefited greatly from her 
association with a number of people who have thought deeply about Medicaid.  A relatively 
recent convert to the close-knit world of people entranced by Medicaid policy, Mr. Rousseau has 
benefited from these associations as well.  In particular we would like to acknowledge the work 
of the members and staff of the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (specifically, 
its Chair, James Tallon, Drew Altman, President of the Foundation, Diane Rowland, Executive 
Vice President and Director of the Commission, and Barbara Lyons, the Commission’s Associate 
Director), Andy Schneider, Esq., whose knowledge of the program is unparalleled, and Patricia 
Riley, President of the National Academy for State Health Policy (and a member of the Kaiser 
Commission) for her guidance over the years on state Medicaid dynamics.  We also would like to 
acknowledge Dr. John Holahan and the rest of the health policy group at the Urban Institute, 
whose statistical studies of the Medicaid program not only support the work of the Kaiser 
Commission  (and are presented in this article) but also have become a basic building block of 
Medicaid policy making.  Finally, Professor Rosenbaum wishes to thank James Weill, Director of 
the Food Research and Action Center in Washington D.C. and Professor David Chavkin of 
American University, Washington College of Law, both of whom helped Professor Rosenbaum 
take the Medicaid plunge in the early years and whose early work on behalf of program 
beneficiaries is still recognized today. 
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Part II opens this article with an overview of Medicaid’s place in the 
modern health system and the multiple roles it plays.  Part III presents a legal 
and statistical overview of Medicaid.  The article concludes in Part IV with an 
analysis of the major challenges that confront the program and the prospects 
for reform. 
In brief, we argue here that even though Medicaid is in tremendous need of 
modernization, its continuation as a federal legal entitlement to a range of 
health services, which surpass what is available under conventional insurance, 
is critical to the very survival of the nation’s market-driven health system.  
Medicaid is the means by which public policy makers have stabilized Medicaid 
financing and the foundation on which the system flourishes.  In our view, it is 
possible to imagine the national health scheme without Medicaid only at the 
point when policy makers choose to move the American health system off of 
its market-principle base and onto a comprehensive social insurance platform 
with universal coverage.  Since policy makers do not show any indication that 
they are inclined to undertake such a momentous shift in health policy 
thinking, the modernization of Medicaid becomes essential. 
II. MEDICAID AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH SYSTEM 
Building on previous public assistance programs, Medicaid began as a 
modest legislative companion to Medicare2 and has come to occupy a singular 
position in American health policy.  Simultaneously lauded for its 
achievements in improving health care access for low income and medically 
vulnerable persons3 and heavily criticized for its structural deficiencies and 
immense size,4 Medicaid at thirty-five is far more important to the American 
health care system than it was at the time of its original enactment.  The 
seminal question is whether Medicaid can be modernized without sacrificing 
its core strength as an individually enforceable legal entitlement program for 
low income and medically indigent persons. 
With prospects for the enactment of comprehensive national health 
insurance so limited,5 Medicaid reform can be expected to be a dominant and 
 
 2. See ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A 
CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID 42-51 (1974) [hereinafter WELFARE MEDICINE]. 
 3. Mark L. Berk & Claudia L. Shur, Access to Care: How Much Difference Does Medicaid 
Make?, HEALTH AFF.,  May-June 1998, at 169-80. 
 4. See, e.g., THE CENTURY FOUNDATION, THE BASICS: MEDICAID REFORM: WHAT’S 
WRONG WITH MEDICAID? 1, available at http://www.tcf.org/publications/Basics/medicaid/ 
Whats_Wrong.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2000). 
 5. As of the summer of 2000, health reform had once again emerged as a major issue in the 
Presidential race.  Both candidates had fashioned health proposals, which, while different in 
certain significant respects, were incremental in nature in that they attempted to address the need 
for coverage of various pockets of uninsured individuals rather than replacing the existing 
pluralistic system of coverage in the U.S. with a single national policy and legislative scheme. 
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recurrent theme in the coming years.  This continued interest in Medicaid 
reflects the extraordinary policy attention that the program has received since 
its inception.  Over the past three decades, Medicaid has served as a legislative 
vehicle for an astonishing range of medical and public health initiatives 
including: the reduction of infant mortality and improvement of child health 
among low income women and children;6 the improvement of community-
based long-term care services for the frail elderly, and children and adults with 
physical and mental disabilities;7 the provision of insurance coverage for low 
income working families8 and persons with disabilities who return to work;9 
assistance to the lower income Medicare beneficiaries without the means to 
purchase private supplemental insurance;10 the development of a public 
childhood vaccine purchasing system to assure an adequate supply of pediatric 
vaccines for low income and uninsured children;11 initiatives to improve the 
treatment of persons with HIV/AIDS12 and tuberculosis;13 the reform of the 
 
Elizabeth White & Kurt Fernandez, Bush and Gore Vary on Health Care Policy Issues,  8 BNA 
HEALTH CARE POLICY REPORT, Aug. 14, 2000, at 1385.  It is worth noting, moreover, that even 
in the Clinton Administration’s national health reform plan, which would in fact have replaced 
existing public and private insurance arrangements with a single legislative scheme, the 
Administration elected to preserve various components of Medicaid that provide coverage for 
long-term care as well as additional services for children and adults with chronic illnesses and 
conditions.  See generally The Health Security Act, S. 1757, 103d Cong. (1993).  The ongoing 
need for Medicaid benefits and services even following the presumed enactment of national 
health reform is a testament to the program’s capacity to address issues that fall outside of 
normative concepts of health insurance, a matter discussed at length in this article. 
 6. Between 1984 and 1990, Congress expanded Medicaid on seven separate occasions to 
expand eligibility for pregnant women, infants and children and to improve coverage for 
maternity and pediatric care.  Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid Expansions and Access to Care, in 
MEDICAID FINANCING CRISIS: BALANCING RESPONSIBILITIES, PRIORITIES, AND DOLLARS 45, 48 
(Diane Rowaland et al. eds., 1993). 
 7. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., 
MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK: BACKGROUND DATA AND ANALYSIS (A 1993 UPDATE) 800, 816, 873 
(Comm. Print 1993) [hereinafter MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK]. 
 8. Medicaid was amended to add an extended transitional work program for families 
making the welfare to work transition.  42 U.S.C. § 601 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 9. ANDY SCHNEIDER & RISA ELLBERGER, THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND 
THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID-RELATED PROVISIONS IN THE TICKET TO WORK AND WORK 
INCENTIVES IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1999 2 (PUB. L. 106-170) (2000), available at 
http://www.kff.org. 
 10. Social Security Act §1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(X), 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(X) (1994). 
 11. Social Security Act §1928(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. §1396s(a)(1)(A) (1994). 
 12. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 7, at 1093-94.  For a comprehensive review of 
Medicaid and HIV/AIDS, see TIMOTHY WESTMORELAND, THE KAISER COMMISSION ON 
MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID AND HIV/AIDS POLICY (1999), available at 
http://www.kff.org. 
 13. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XII), (z), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XII), 
(z) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
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nursing home industry;14 the establishment of managed care systems for 
beneficiaries with both basic and complex physical and mental health care 
needs;15 aid to “safety-net” hospitals and clinics that serve large numbers of 
poor and uninsured patients;16 and coverage of women with breast and cervical 
cancer.17  Indeed, the evolution of Medicaid, captured in Figure 1, makes clear 
that even a partial summary of Medicaid’s amendments since its original 
enactment underscores its policy significance.18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 7, at 854-55. 
 15. Social Security Act § 1932(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 16. This assistance has taken two basic forms.  First, hospitals that serve a “disproportionate 
number” of Medicaid and low income individuals are entitled to receive additional payments.  
Social Security Act §1902(a)(13), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).  Second, 
clinics that receive federal funding under the Public Health Service Act, as well as certain other 
clinical entities that meet PHS Act standards, are classified as “federally qualified health centers” 
under the law and are entitled to receive cost-related reimbursement for the covered services they 
furnish to Medicaid beneficiaries.  Social Security Act § 1905(a)(2)(C), (l)(2)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C. § 
1396d(a)(2)(C), (l)(2)(A)-(B) (1994).  For an extended analysis of the relationship between safety 
net providers and Medicaid, see INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE SAFETY 
NET: INTACT BUT ENDANGERED 1 (Marion Ein Lewin & Stuart Altman eds., 2000).  For a review 
of state disproportionate share payment policies see Teresa A. Coughlin & David Liska, 
Changing State and Federal Payment Policies for Medicaid Disproportionate-Share Hospitals, 
HEALTH AFF., May-June 1998, at 118. 
 17. Breast and Cervical Cancer Prevention and Treatment Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-354, 
114 Stat. 1381 (2000). 
 18. See Figure 1. 
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Beyond its role as a vehicle for national health priority initiatives, 
Medicaid has served as a policy and programmatic springboard for state-based 
health reform efforts under special waivers by the federal government of 
otherwise applicable federal Medicaid law.19  These health reform efforts have 
not always been without controversy;20 however, they have succeeded in 
moving Medicaid into the modern managed care era.  Furthermore, Medicaid 
has achieved greater levels of health coverage among uninsured low income 
working families21 and, thus, had encouraged policy makers to reconceptualize 
Medicaid beyond its original roots as a companion to cash welfare assistance 
and a source of financing for medically indigent persons who fall outside the 
workforce.22 
Part of the explanation for the frequency with which Medicaid has been 
used to address significant health policy issues lies in the fact that, from its 
inception, the program has been associated with the provision of care to the 
poor and underserved.23 As a result, policy makers have logically turned to 
Medicaid as the need to address problems affecting vulnerable populations 
arose. 
In our view, however, the program’s ongoing role as a legislative 
powerhouse for public health policy extends beyond mere temporal legislative 
convenience.  Medicaid’s ability to adapt itself to such a broad range of health 
needs stems from the fact that despite its legendary complexity,24 the program 
 
 19. Sara Rosenbaum et al., Section 1115 Medicaid Waivers: Charting a Path for Medicaid 
Managed Care Reform, in THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, 
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: PROMISES AND PROSPECTS FOR LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 179, 181-
82 (Marsha Lillie-Blanton et al. eds., 1999), available at http://www.kff.org. 
 20. See Leighton Ku et al., Medicaid Managed Care Programs in Hawaii, Oklahoma, Rhode 
Island, and Tennessee, in REMAKING MEDICAID: MANAGED CARE FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD 147 
(Steve Davidson & Stephen Somers eds., 1998). 
 21. Id. at 162. 
 22. WELFARE MEDICINE, supra note 2, at 51-53, 57-61. 
 23. Id. at 57. 
 24. In its seminal study of the Medicaid program, the Congressional Research Service notes 
that “[t]o many the program [Medicaid] is an enigma.”  MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 7, 
at vii.  Medicaid has been the subject of numerous outbursts by federal courts, aghast at the 
complexity of the law.  See, e.g., Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1976) which noted 
Medicaid’s  “statutory provisions and HEW regulations of labyrinthine complexity.”  Id. at 727.  
The court included the following memorable footnote in its decision: “As program after program 
has evolved, there has developed a degree of complexity in the Social Security Act and 
particularly the regulations which makes them almost unintelligible to the uninitiated.  There 
should be no such form of reference as ‘45 C.F.R. § 248.3(c)(1)(ii)(B)(2)’ discussed below; a 
draftsman who has gotten himself into a position requiring anything like this should make a fresh 
start.  Such unintelligibility is doubly unfortunate in the case of a statute dealing with the rights of 
poor people.  An indispensable service is performed by attorneys like those representing the 
plaintiffs here, who advance tenable claims with clarity and courtesy even if, as in this case, not 
with success.”  Id. at 728 n.7. 
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is extraordinarily simple in structure when compared to conventional 
insurance.  Medicaid can be thought of as a structured flow of federal funds 
that permits health care expenditures for populations who, because of poverty, 
health risks or health status, lie outside of conventional insurance.25  In a real 
sense, Medicaid has saved the nation’s market-based health system through its 
ability to provide generous levels of funding for national health priorities that 
exist beyond the furthest reaches of the market. 
Moreover, Medicaid is exquisitely protean in nature.  This flexibility flows 
from the fact that it operates outside of, and in direct contrast to, the principles 
and conventions of health insurance,26 although individuals who are legally 
entitled to coverage are counted as insured for statistical purposes.27  This 
distinction between Medicaid and health insurance shows up in three critically 
important ways. 
The first is eligibility for coverage.  Because it is not concerned with 
“risk,” Medicaid does not restrict coverage to persons with insurable risks; 
indeed, it invites in the sickest and most disabled members of society.  Unlike 
private health insurance28 or Medicare,29 Medicaid contains neither pre-
existing condition exclusion clauses nor waiting periods.30  Numerous 
 
 25. By conventional insurance, we mean insurance products that are sold commercially and 
that operate on the basis of actuarial risk principles.  See Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the 
Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & LAW 287 (1993). 
 26. Deborah Stone’s article, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, offers an 
excellent and succinct comparison of social versus commercial insurance and eloquently 
describes the conflict between the concept of actuarial fairness (also known as “fair 
discrimination”) that underlies commercial coverage and the needs of individuals who for reasons 
of social and health risk factors require health care at levels greater than the norm.  See id. at 290-
94.  For an additional discussion of the concept of “fair discrimination” see RAND E. 
ROSENBLATT, SYLVIA A. LAW & SARA ROSENBAUM, LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 
SYSTEM 207-09 (David L. Shapiro et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter LAW AND THE AMERICAN 
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM]. 
 27. For example, the United States Census Bureau classifies individuals with Medicaid as 
insured.  See, e.g., JENNIFER A. CAMPBELL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMERCE, ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 
1998: CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 6 fig.6-7 (1999). 
 28. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) limited, but 
did not prohibit, the use of pre-existing condition and exclusion clauses from employer-sponsored 
group health plans.  See Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1939 (codified as amended 29 U.S.C. 
1181) (amending ERISA to limiting both the duration of the “look-back” period for preexisting 
condition exclusion clauses under group health plans as well as the allowable length of the 
exclusionary period). 
 29. The Medicare statute imposes a twenty-four-month waiting period on individuals who 
qualify for coverage by virtue of disability status.  Social Security Act § 1811, 42 U.S.C. §1395c 
(1994). 
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).  Medicaid eligibility is conditioned 
solely on the criteria described in this article.  The statute does not impose waiting periods or 
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eligibility categories are specifically designed to target persons with high 
health risks including children who need long-term care, persons with 
tuberculosis, children and women with HIV/AIDS, the frail elderly and 
persons with disabilities.31 
The second distinction between Medicaid and insurance relates to benefits.  
The services and benefits made available under the program are not limited to 
those found in a typical commercial insurance benefit package.  In contrast to 
conventional insurance, covered benefits extend well into the realm of long-
term care and include such interventions as personal care services, respite care, 
home care adaptation and case management.32 
The third, and perhaps most overlooked distinction has to do with the 
standards by which coverage decisions are made under the program.  In light 
of the fact that its origins lie with a population of workers, conventional 
insurance typically limits actual coverage for enumerated benefits to items and 
services that are necessary to “restore normal functioning” following an 
“illness or injury.”33  This standard, which may be appropriate for most 
members of working families, can fall with great harshness on children and 
adults with chronic illnesses and disabilities,34 particularly disabilities that are 
tied to conditions, such as cerebral palsy or other congenital problems, that are 
neither an “illness” nor an “injury.”  In applying this standard to persons with 
chronic illnesses and disabilities, insurers may deny coverage altogether 
because their conditions place them outside of the contractual conditions of 
coverage.35 
 
exclude coverage for certain conditions.  Indeed, federal regulations expressly prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of a condition in coverage for required services. 
 31. See the categorical eligibility groupings identified in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(I)-
(XII) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 32. See MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 7, at vii.  Federal law requires participating 
states to provide certain classes of “medical assistance” to individuals who are entitled to 
coverage and gives states the option to extend coverage for many additional classes of medical 
assistance.  Certain types of services commonly associated with long-term care, such as nursing 
home services, are mandatory.  42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A), 1396d(a)(xii)(4) (1994).  Other 
types of services, such as the services of personal attendants and case management, are optional. 
 33. LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, supra note 26. 
 34. Individuals with disabilities cannot recover from their conditions, even though they may 
be able to attain or maintain certain functional status or may benefit from health care in the sense 
that their health status does not deteriorate further.  See Bedrick v. Travelers Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 
149, 151 (4th Cir. 1996), for the proposition that however laudable may be the goals of functional 
improvement and prevention of deterioration, they lie beyond the reaches of contractual insurance 
limits.  Id. 
 35. The impact of this standard can best be seen in Bedrick, in which an insurer completely 
denied coverage for physical therapy in the case of a child with severe cerebral palsy because in 
the view of the insurer there was no hope that a child with this condition could benefit from 
therapy.  Id. at 151.  In a remarkable opinion holding that the conduct of the insurer was arbitrary 
and capricious, the appeals court reversed significant portions of the decision.  Id. at 154.  
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Consistent with the populations it covers and the services it furnishes, 
Medicaid contains no such limitations.  Federal law makes it unlawful to 
discriminate in the provision of required services on the basis of a condition.36  
As a result, state Medicaid programs must adopt medically reasonable 
coverage limits37 and must extend medically necessary services and benefits 
they cover to any beneficiary, regardless of whether the need for the service is 
related to a chronic condition or a completely correctable illness or injury.38 
For these three basic reasons, Medicaid stands wholly apart from 
commercial insurance conventions.  The result is an ability to respond to 
national health policy priorities whose resolution extends beyond the limits of 
conventional insurance.  These three principal distinctions between Medicaid 
and insurance also underscore the implications to the entire health system were 
Medicaid to disappear.  Although there is an enormous need to modernize 
Medicaid, if the program were to cease to operate in its current basic form as a 
legal entitlement to coverage, the number of uninsured Americans would 
skyrocket from forty-four million to a number approaching seventy million.39  
Furthermore, billions of dollars in public financing for non-insurable services, 
ranging from long-term nursing home care to extended community and 
outpatient services for children and adults with chronic illnesses and 
disabilities, would be at stake.40 
Medicaid’s importance extends far beyond the populations it covers and 
the services it underwrites.  The program is fundamental to the economic 
health of state and local governments.  This is because the statute entitles states 
to open-ended federal financing toward both the medical and administrative 
costs of Medicaid, with federal contribution levels for medical assistance costs 
that range from fifty percent  to nearly seventy-seven percent of total 
expenditures in fiscal year (“FY”) 2000.41  Because Medicaid expenditures 
 
Because so few denials by insurers ever reach court at all, much less a federal appeals court, one 
can only surmise the frequency with which this type of standard is applied. 
 36. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c) (1999). 
 37. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d) (1999). 
 38. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b) (1999). 
 39. As of 1998, 44.3 million Americans were uninsured. THE KAISER COMMISSION ON 
MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, UNINSURED IN AMERICA: A CHART BOOK 12 (2000), available 
at http://www.kff.org.  Approximately twenty-three million non-elderly Americans had Medicaid 
coverage in 1997.  See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CENTERS FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HEALTH, UNITED STATES 2000, 340 tbl.128 (2000).  
Assuming that nearly all of these individuals would be otherwise uninsured in the absence of 
Medicaid, the number of uninsured would rise considerably. 
 40. See infra Figure 9, which shows that 74% of all spending under Medicaid is for services 
and benefits that are other than preventive and acute care services for non-disabled working age 
adults and non-disabled children. 
 41. ANDY SCHNEIDER & DAVID ROUSSEAU, THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND 
THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID FINANCING 19 (2000), available at http://www.kff.org. 
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comprise the majority of total state spending on health care, this level of 
federal financial participation provides major aid to states in meeting the 
overall cost of medical care, which is by far the fastest growing portion of their 
public welfare budgets.42  To be sure, states must comply with extensive 
federal requirements as a condition of receiving federal payments, the most 
important of which relates to their obligations toward program beneficiaries.43  
At the same time, federal Medicaid payments are so substantial that Medicaid 
funding has evolved into one of the essential pillars of states’ economies.  
Even the lure of a 1995 Congressional proposal, as part of welfare reform, to 
“block grant” Medicaid and strip out all legal requirements and protections in 
exchange for an aggregate fixed upper limit on federal contributions to state 
programs pegged to the general inflation rate, failed in the end and was 
removed from the final legislation.44 
Medicaid is essential to a triumvirate of stakeholders, including the states 
that are entitled to federal payments on an open-ended basis, participating 
health care providers that are entitled to payment for the covered services they 
furnish to program beneficiaries, and the individuals who have an enforceable 
legal entitlement to coverage.45  Although their interests frequently tend to 
sharply diverge, particularly in the case of initiatives to mandate coverage 
expansion or payment reforms, this group of stakeholders has coexisted for 
thirty-five years.  Historically, this core Medicaid stakeholder group has been 
supplemented, at least informally, by considerable public support for the 
program by the commercial health insurance industry46 as well as by 
 
 42. Over the past decade, state spending on public welfare services has grown faster than the 
gross domestic product (GDP) or the rate of growth in per capita revenues.  While the entire 
public welfare component grew by seventy-one percent, vendor payments to health care providers 
grew by 111% over the same time period.  DAVID MERRIMAN, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, WHAT 
ACCOUNTS FOR THE GROWTH OF STATE GOVERNMENT BUDGETS IN THE 1990s? 1, 3 tbl.2 (Series 
A No.39) (2000), available at http://www.urban.org. 
 43. See generally MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 7, at 1-20 (summarizing the basic 
requirements of the program). 
 44. The Medicaid block grant legislation was originally a part of the same legislative vehicle 
that contained the welfare reform legislation.  See Sara Rosenbaum & Kathleen A. Maloy, The 
Law of Unintended Consequences: The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act and its Impact on Medicaid for Families with Children, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 
1443 (1999) [hereinafter The Law of Unintended Consequences]. 
 45. While decisions by the Supreme Court have in recent years limited the ability of 
individuals to claim an enforceable right to benefits under various Social Security Act programs, 
as a general rule the federal courts have continued to recognize the enforceability of the Medicaid 
statute.  LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, supra note 26, at 253-62 (1999-2000 
Supp.). 
 46. For example, the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) has traditionally 
called for Medicaid expansions as part of its national health reform proposals.  HIAA’s current 
proposal contains Medicaid expansions. HIAA Press Releases, HIAA Is Fortune’s Top Health 
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employers and insurance purchasers.  While the support of insurers and 
employers has been valuable to the success of the program and the enactment 
of specific legislative reforms,47 their interest in a strong Medicaid program 
has not been purely altruistic.  Were Medicaid not to exist, private interests 
conceivably could face a far more difficult policy and regulatory environment 
in the absence of a program that is capable of absorbing the billions of dollars 
in annual health care expenditure responsibilities that lie outside of the 
marketplace. 
At the same time that Medicaid enjoys both explicit and tacit support, it is 
precisely this sea of interest that makes it so difficult to achieve structural 
improvements in light of the divergent views regarding the wisdom or value of 
program modification.  The cost of modernizing Medicaid would be relatively 
significant.  As a result, the constraints of the federal budget process itself 
create additional impediments to reform.  Finally, the obvious need, for the 
reasons stated above, for a health care financing mechanism that operates 
outside the principles of insurance,  expanding and strengthening Medicaid can 
be viewed as tantamount to an admission of “market failure.”  For those who 
advocate a pure market approach to health reform, for example the use of 
vouchers or tax credits to aid in the purchase of private insurance or the greater 
deductibility for out-of-pocket expenditures on health care, a Medicaid 
expansion would be precisely the wrong remedy.  For all of these reasons, 
Medicaid struggles forward, long on achievements but burdened by serious 
deficiencies that significantly hamper the program’s effectiveness. 
III. A LEGAL AND STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF MEDICAID 
In order to understand Medicaid’s role, it is necessary to have a basic 
understanding of program structure and design, and to be familiar with at least 
basic statistical data illustrating the program’s operations in the areas of 
enrollment coverage and program expenditures.  Even the limited overview of 
Medicaid presented in this article underscores its complexity, size and potential 
impact on health care. 
A. Program Structure 
Medicaid, the largest of all means-tested entitlement laws, is a federal 
grant-in-aid program that entitles individuals who meet its eligibility 
 
Insurance Trade Assn. for 3rd Consecutive Year (Nov. 15, 1999), at http://www.hiaa.org/news/ 
news-current/press-releases/release110.html. 
 47. Professor Rosenbaum notes that in her previous position as director of the Health 
Division at the Children’s Defense Fund (“CDF”) in Washington D.C., CDF routinely sought and 
received the enthusiastic support of insurers and employer organizations for a wide variety of 
Medicaid initiatives over the years to improve coverage for women and children. 
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requirements to a defined set of benefits known as “medical assistance.”48 The 
law also affords participating states the right to federal contributions toward 
the cost of both the medical assistance and program administration.49  In FY 
year 1997, the latest year for which final data are available, total federal and 
state Medicaid spending stood at $161.2 billion.50 
Medicaid is voluntary for states which, as a condition of participation, 
must agree to administer their programs in accordance with a series of federal 
requirements set forth in both the statute and regulations.51  Participating states 
must administer their programs through a “single state agency” which may be 
any agency (for example a unit of the state welfare or public health agency).52  
Regardless of which part of state government serves as the single state agency, 
federal law requires that eligibility for Medicaid be determined by the state 
welfare agency.53 Federal law also requires states to supplement this basic 
eligibility determination function with outstationed enrollment activities for 
certain populations in order to improve case-finding and applicants with the 
enrollment process.54 Federal Medicaid administrative payments are available 
to support the cost of the enrollment process, including outstationing.55 
All discussions of Medicaid begin with the question: who is eligible?  
Medicaid eligibility requirements are notoriously complex.  Eligibility for 
 
 48. Social Security Act § 1905(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (1994). 
 49. Social Security Act § 1903(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 50. Data from the Health Care Financing Administration; calculations by the Urban Institute 
for the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured.  See infra Figure 10. 
 51. Social Security Act § 1902 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1396a, et. seq.  Federal regulations are 
codified as part of Chapter 42 of the Code of Federal Regulations.  The Health Care Financing 
Administration also issues extensive informal program guidance, which can be found at its 
website, Health Care Financing Administration, http://www.hcfa.gov. 
 52. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (1994).  State Medicaid plans 
identify a range of state agencies as the Medicaid agency.  Katie Tedrow, Organizing Medicaid 
Responsibilities: A Look at Current State Agency Structure, 12 AM. PUB. HUM. SERVS. ASS’N. 
WASH. MEMO 21 (2000). 
 53. Social Security Act §1902(a)(5), 42 U.S.C. 1936a(a)(5) (1994).  In the case of applicants 
for the federally administered Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, which is 
administered by the Social Security Administration, states may enter into agreements with SSA 
under which the federal government determines Medicaid eligibility as part of the SSI application 
process.  Id. 
 54. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(55), 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(5) (1994). 
 55. Outstationed enrollment is mandatory for children and pregnant women and must be 
provided at federally qualified health centers and disproportionate share hospitals.  At their 
option, states may conduct outstationing and outreach activities in any location.  Outstationing is 
relatively common in the case of children, in the wake of the enactment of the State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program of 1997 (SCHIP) which operates as a companion program to the basic 
Medicaid structure and which serves as a catalyst for the identification of eligible children.  See 
LYNDA FLOWERS & TRISH RILEY, NATIONAL ACADEMY FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, AN 
ANALYSIS OF POLICY ISSUES IN SCHIP AND MEDICAID IMPLEMENTATION 3 (2000). 
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federally assisted Medicaid benefits56 depends on an individual’s ability to 
satisfy several basic eligibility criteria, the principal ones are categorical 
eligibility, financial eligibility, state residency and citizenship/legal residency 
requirements.57  We focus here on categorical and financial eligibility, 
although failure to satisfy residency or legal status requirements58 will be 
equally disqualifying. 
Medicaid requires that in order to be eligible for federally assisted 
coverage, an applicant must fall into one of the federally recognized eligibility 
categories.  As of 1993, the federal statute contained over fifty separate 
coverage categories,59 and more have been added since then.60  Medicaid’s 
principal mandatory coverage categories, that is, the categories of beneficiaries 
whom all state plans must cover as a condition of participation are pregnant 
women, children born after September 30, 1983 and under age nineteen, 
individuals who meet states’ July, 1996 eligibility criteria for Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children,61 certain qualified severely impaired individuals and 
recipients of Supplemental Security Income (SSI).62  In addition, states must 
 
 56. States may of course extend Medicaid to any individual regardless of whether federal 
eligibility criteria are met if they are willing to bear financial responsibility for total program 
costs.  With limited exceptions states restrict coverage to individuals and services for whom 
federal financial participation is available. 
 57. An individual must be a resident of the state in which he applies for benefits.  Special 
residency rules have been developed to determine residency in the case of persons 
institutionalized outside of the state, children living in out-of-state foster care and adoption 
arrangements, and migrant agricultural workers.  42 C.F.R. § 403 (1994).  The Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 established a legal presumption 
against coverage of individuals who are legal residents but not citizens, although the law contains 
numerous exceptions. SARA ROSENBAUM, THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE 
UNINSURED, MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY AND CITIZENSHIP STATUS: POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR 
IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS 1 (2000) [hereinafter IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS], available at 
http://www.kff.org. 
 58. For a complete discussion of Medicaid and legal status requirements, see generally id. 
 59. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 7, at 3. 
 60. Coverage categories added in recent years include vaccine eligible children, Social 
Security Act § 1927, 42 U.S.C. § 1396s (1994); optional targeted low income children, Social 
Security Act, § 1902(a)(10)(a)(ii)(VII), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(a)(ii)(VII) (1994); employed 
individuals with medically improved disabilities, Social Security Act § 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XVI), 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(II)(XIII) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); and independent foster care 
adolescents, Social Security Act, § 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XVII); 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XVII) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 61. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 
(1996).  For a discussion of the welfare reform and its implications for Medicaid eligibility, see 
generally The Law of Unintended Consequences, supra note 44. 
 62. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(10)(A)(i)(II), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(II) (1994). 
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furnish cost-sharing assistance to certain low income Medicare beneficiaries.63  
Optional coverage categories include numerous additional categories of 
families, and elderly and disabled persons,64 and medically needy 
individuals.65  Medically needy persons are individuals who fall into one of the 
federally recognized coverage categories, but whose incomes and resources 
exceed “categorically needy” eligibility levels.  As a result, they spend down to 
eligibility by personally incurring medical care costs, a process that can be 
thought of as a deductible.66  Figure 2 sets forth Medicaid’s principal 
categorical “eligibility pathways.” 
Medicaid also requires that applicants satisfy the program’s financial 
eligibility rules.  All participating states must adopt certain mandatory 
minimum financial eligibility guidelines, but with the notable exception of 
children, pregnant women, and certain workers with disabilities, these 
standards are notoriously strict.  An applicant’s financial eligibility depends on 
both income and assets, although states have the authority to waive or 
liberalize asset tests in the case of certain applicants and recipients who do not 
receive cash assistance.67  Federal law also contains complex standards for 
calculating family income, which vary by coverage group.68 As Figure 2 
illustrates, the minimum income eligibility standards vary by group and range 
from slightly above the federal poverty level in the case of pregnant women, 
infants and young children69 to state-set standards that average well below the 
federal poverty level in the case of most non-disabled, non-elderly adults.70  
 
 63. Low income Medicare beneficiaries whose incomes exceed Medicaid eligibility levels 
qualify for cost-sharing assistance for Medicare premiums, deductibles and coinsurance. Social 
Security Act §1905d(p), 42 U.S.C. § 1396d (1994). 
 64. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(I)-(XII), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(I)-
(XII) (1994). 
 65. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(10)(C). 
 66. These individuals effectively “spend down” to Medicaid coverage by spending their 
“excess” income and resources on medical care.  MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 7, at 12.  
The program primarily is a means for financing high cost long-term institutional care such as 
nursing home care.  See 42 C.F.R. § 435.300-350 (1999). 
 67. Social Security Act §§ 1902(r)(2), 1931. 
 68. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(17), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1994); 42 C.F.R. § 
435.600-640 (1999). 
 69. In 2000, the federal poverty level for a family of three was $14,150 in the forty-eight 
contiguous states and the District of Columbia.  OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR 
PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE 2000 
HHS POVERTY GUIDELINES 1 (2000), available at http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/00 
poverty.htm. 
 70. The standard for non-disabled, non-elderly adults must be tied to the most closely 
associated “welfare category” which, in this case, would be the AFDC program. Social Security 
Act, § 1902(a)(17), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17).  Furthermore, federal law generally limits the 
maximum income standard for beneficiaries to 133% of the AFDC payment level for a family of 
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The effect of these standards on eligibility is so enormous that in 1999 a 
mother working full-time at the minimum wage would not be able to qualify 
for coverage for herself, although she could secure it for her children.71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
States have significant latitude to establish financial eligibility conditions 
for all categorical groups.  In the case of children, pregnant women, and 
families with children, persons with disabilities, and the elderly, states may 
liberalize the standards and methodologies beyond those that are used to 
determine eligibility for cash assistance.72 As a result, a state could, for 
example, extend coverage to all families with children where family incomes 
are at or below twice the federal poverty level, regardless of work status.73 
Individuals who meet program eligibility requirements are entitled under 
federal law to a defined set of benefits.74  Federal law lists numerous benefit 
 
that size with no other income.  Social Security Act § 1903(f)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(f).  There 
are numerous exceptions to this rule, however. 
 71. The Law of Unintended Consequences, supra note 44, at 1470. 
 72. Social Security Act §§ 1902(r)(2) & 1931. 
 73. The Law of Unintended Consequences, supra note 44, at 1470. The District of Columbia, 
for example, covers all resident families with children with family incomes at or below 200% of 
the federal poverty level. 
 74. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(10)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (1994).  As noted 
previously, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Suter v. Artist M, 503 U.S. 347 (1992), the 
question of whether Medicaid creates legally enforceable entitlement rights has become 
somewhat unsettled. Courts have tended to take a case-by-case approach to the issue, ruling on 
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groupings, some of which participating states are required to furnish to 
“categorically needy” beneficiaries75 (i.e., beneficiaries who do not qualify for 
Medicaid as medically needy persons).  Other benefits are optional in the care 
of adults.76  Required benefits consist of inpatient hospital care, outpatient 
hospital care, nursing facility care, physician services, laboratory and x-ray 
services, services of federally qualified health centers and rural health clinics, 
family planning services and supplies for individuals of childbearing age 
(including sexually active minors), early and periodic screening diagnostic and 
treatment (EPSDT) services for individuals under age twenty-one, and nurse 
midwife and nurse practitioner services.77  Optional benefits are extensive and 
range from basic preventive services to advanced long-term care benefits.78  
Most states cover most classes of benefits, although with limitations.79 
Regardless of whether benefits are covered under a state plan on a 
mandatory or optional basis, federal law sets minimum standards for 
determining the reasonableness of coverage.80 Although states have discretion 
to set limits on coverage, coverage limits must be reasonable;81 in the case of 
required services, states may not discriminate on the basis of diagnosis or 
 
the enforceability of the statute in light of the specific provisions of law that plaintiffs seek to 
enforce.  See supra text accompanying note 45.  Thus, for example, beneficiaries with disabilities 
are generally accorded a legal right to enforce the requirement that services be furnished with 
“reasonable promptness.”  See Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 1998); Cramer v. Chiles, 33 
F. Supp. 2d 1342 (D. Fla. 1999); Lewis v. New Mexico Dep’t. of Health, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D. 
N.M. 2000); Sobky v. Smoley, 855 F. Supp. 1123 (9th Cir. 1994); Rodriguez v. City of New 
York, 197 F.3d 611 (2d Cir. 1999).  Similarly, children are considered to have an enforceable 
right to early and periodic screening diagnostic and treatment benefits (EPSDT).  See Frew v. 
Gilbert, No. 3:93CA65, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 12410 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2000), Salazar v. 
District of Columbia, 954 F. Supp. 278 (D. D.C. 1996); Pittman v. Florida Dep’t of Health and 
Rehab. Serv., 998 F.2d 887 (11th Cir. 1993); Miller v. Whitburn, 10 F.3d 1315 (7th Cir. 1993); 
Hunter v. Chiles, 944 F. Supp. 914 (S.D. Fla. 1996). 
 75. Social Security Act § 1902 (a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (1994). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Social Security Act § 1905(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (1994).  The most prominent 
optional benefit is prescribed drugs. 
 79. In the case of children entitled to EPSDT services, all service limitations that otherwise 
would be permissible for adults are prohibited, both with respect to classes of benefits and the 
amount, duration and scope of coverage that is required.  Social Security Act § 1905(r)(5), 42 
U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5) (1994). 
 80. Chiles, 136 F.3d at 715. 
 81. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(a) (2000).  The reasonableness test is measured against the total 
beneficiary population rather than subclasses of beneficiaries.  Thus, for example, where a state 
uses a 3-physician-visit limit per month and permits additional visits with prior authorization, the 
limitation is sufficient to satisfy the needs of more than 95% of all beneficiaries and is considered 
reasonable.  Curtis v. Taylor, 648 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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condition.82  States may use appropriate coverage criteria based on medical 
necessity.83 
In the case of children under age twenty-one, Medicaid coverage is the 
broadest of any public or private health coverage arrangement in the U.S.  
States must, in the case of children and as part of the EPSDT program, cover 
all federally recognized categories of benefits and services that are determined 
to be medically necessary, regardless of whether in the case of the over-
twenty-one population otherwise applicable across-the-board limitations would 
be considered reasonable.84  In addition, EPSDT covers a broad range of  
preventive health services.85 
The breadth of Medicaid’s benefit entitlement extends beyond amount, 
duration and scope considerations.  The program also prohibits virtually all 
patient cost sharing, including premiums, deductibles and coinsurance.86  Thus, 
with the exception of the medically needy, who as noted  “spend down” to 
financial eligibility,87 recipients may be charged only nominal amounts for 
coverage and services.88 
While federal requirements are stringent in the case of coverage, they 
afford states considerable latitude in the areas of provider qualification, 
participation and compensation. States also have broad discretion with respect 
to service delivery.89  Only qualified providers are permitted to participate in 
Medicaid;90 however, with certain exceptions,91 states have significant 
flexibility to set provider participation standards.92  In the case of certain 
groups of providers, including federally qualified health centers, rural health 
clinics, hospice programs and disproportionate share hospitals, the statute 
 
 82. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b), (c) (1999). 
 83. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d) (1999). 
 84. Social Security Act § 1905(r)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5) (1994).  Pittman, 998 F.2d at 
892; Miller, 10 F.3d at 1320; Hunter, 944 F. Supp. at 920. 
 85. Social Security Act § 1905(r).  Preventive services include periodic assessments of 
growth and development, all age appropriate immunizations recommended by the Advisory 
Committee on Immunization Practice (ACIP) and complete vision, dental and hearing care. 
 86. Social Security Act §§ 1902(a)(14), 1916, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(14), 1396o (1994 & 
Supp. III 1997).  Cost-sharing is prohibited in the case of children under eighteen, pregnant 
women and nursing facility residents.  States do have the option to impose more substantial cost 
sharing on certain groups of individuals, including former persons with disabilities who qualify 
for Medicaid on the basis of their work status but whose income is moderate.  The premiums 
must be income related.  SCHNEIDER & ELLBERGER, supra note 9. 
 87. 42 C.F.R. § 435.800-843 (1999). 
 88. See Social Security Act § 1902(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(23), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 91. States must cover the services of federally qualified health centers, rural health clinics, 
nurse midwives, and nurse practitioners.  Social Security Act § 1902(a)(2)(C), (17), (21), 42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(2)(C), (a)(17), (a)(21) (1994). 
 92. Id. 
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contains certain required payment methodologies.93  With respect to health 
centers, which as a matter of law serve large numbers of uninsured patients,94 
federal law prohibits Medicaid programs from demanding deep compensation 
discounts and requires agencies to pay health centers the reasonable cost of 
care; this policy is designed to assure that cost-shifting onto grant funds 
designed to care for the uninsured does not result.95  Similarly, states must 
maintain a formula to define and furnish supplemental payments to hospitals 
that serve a disproportionate number of low income and Medicaid insured 
patients.96  In the case of other providers, states have broad discretion to set 
payment rates.97  However, in setting rates for hospitals and nursing facilities, 
states must adhere to certain procedural notice and comment requirements.98  
Furthermore, payments must be consistent with “efficiency, economy and 
quality of care and . . . sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and 
services are available under the plan at least to the extent that care and services 
are available to the general population in the geographic service area.”99 
In addition to establishing provider qualification standards, Medicaid 
agencies have the option to use various forms of managed care arrangements to 
provide covered services to program enrollees.100  Under federal law, state 
agencies can condition coverage for most groups of beneficiaries on mandatory 
enrollment in some form of managed care arrangement101 and may contract 
with either comprehensive managed care organizations or with primary care 
 
 93. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(13), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 94. The Public Health Service Act § 330, 42 U.S.C. § 254c (Supp. III 1997), authorizes the 
establishment and operation of federally funded health centers.  As a condition of funding, health 
centers must offer certain services, serve populations and communities designated as medically 
underserved, and prospectively adjust their charges in accordance with a fee schedule that reflects 
family income. 
 95. Id.  A similar cost-related payment policy applies to the Medicare program.  Social 
Security Act § 1832(a)(2)(D), 1833(a)(3) (1999). 
 96. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(13)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) (1994 & Supp. IV 
1998). 
 97. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(30)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (1994). 
 98. Id.  These procedural requirements take the place of the Boren Amendment, which 
required states to pay hospitals and nursing homes in accordance with cost-related principles and 
which was repealed by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.  Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. 
No. 105-33, § 4711, 111 Stat. 251 (1997). 
 99. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(30)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (1994). 
 100. For a comprehensive review of state managed care purchasing practices see NEVA KAYE 
& CYNTHIA PERNICE, NATIONAL ACADEMY FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, MEDICAID MANAGED 
CARE: A GUIDE FOR STATES (4th ed. 1999), available at http://www.nashp.org/pubs/ 
medicaid.htm; SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, SCHOOL OF 
PUBLIC HEALTH AND HEALTH SERVICES, NEGOTIATING THE NEW HEALTH SYSTEM: A 
NATIONWIDE STUDY OF MEDICAID MANAGED CARE CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1999). 
 101. Social Security Act § 1932(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. 1396n(a)(1)(A) (1994). 
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case managers, who offer a more limited form of managed care.102  As of 1998, 
more than half of all beneficiaries were enrolled in some form of managed care 
arrangement103 and thirty-eight states made at least some use of managed care 
for persons with disabilities.104 
Medicaid’s status as a legal entitlement has resulted in countless lawsuits 
by beneficiaries who have challenged both individual and across-the-board 
denials and reductions in eligibility and services, as well as violations of 
procedural due process safeguards.  In addition, providers, who are entitled to 
payment for the covered care and services they furnish to enrollees, have 
mounted extensive litigation against state agencies over both the issue of 
payment, as well as the level of payment.105  In addition, providers have 
successfully challenged on due process grounds their exclusion from the 
Medicaid program without prior notice and hearing.106  This extensive 
litigation has continued into the present time, with legal challenges to virtually 
all aspects of state administration, ranging from the adequacy of enrollment 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Data from the Health Care Financing Administration; calculations by the Kaiser 
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, at http://www.kff.org. 
 104. MARSHA REGENSTEIN & CHRISTY SCHROER, KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND 
THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID MANAGED CARE FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: STATE 
PROFILES 5 (1998). 
 105. Provider litigation against Medicaid agencies over payment rates culminated with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990) (holding that 
under Medicaid’s “Boren Amendment,” hospitals had an enforceable legal right to payment levels 
that reflected the cost of care incurred by efficient and economically operated institutions).  The 
Boren Amendment, which was repealed in 1997 by the Balanced Budget Act, covered both 
hospitals and nursing facilities and was long criticized by states as a source of mandatory and 
excessive program expenditures.  Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4712(c), 
111 Stat. 509 (1997).  The language that replaced the Boren Amendment requires states to 
establish and adhere to a public process for determination of rates, but with the exception of 
payments to disproportionate share hospitals, removes any rate standard.  In addition to the Boren 
Amendment, the statute requires that state Medicaid payments be sufficient to ensure that care is 
accessible.  Social Security Act § 1902(a)(30), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30) (1994).  The adequacy 
of payment provisions of the law have resulted in separate and extensive litigation.  See, e.g., 
Clark v. Kizer, 758 F. Supp. 572 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (challenging the sufficiency of dental 
payments). 
 106. In MedCare HMO v. Bradley, a virtually non-functional HMO successfully obtained a 
ruling enjoining the state from removing its Medicaid members and assigning them to other 
functional plans on the ground that it was being deprived of property without due process.  788 F. 
Supp. 1460 (N.D. Ill. 1992). The MedCare ruling, which considered the interests of the HMO, 
without concern for the beneficiaries, was codified into the Medicaid statute as part of the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997.  Social Security Act § 1932(f)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(f)(4) 
(Supp. IV 1998), prohibits the termination of managed care entity contracts without prior notice 
and hearing.  States may, at their discretion, notify enrollees that termination hearings are under 
way and permit members to switch plans.  Id. 
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protections and benefit levels to the operation of managed care and long-term 
care systems, as well as other aspects of the modern Medicaid program.107 
Given the legal exposure that state Medicaid programs incur, the obvious 
question is “what is in it for a state?”  The answer lies in the states’ legally 
enforceable entitlement to federal financial assistance on an open-ended basis 
for the medical assistance and administrative service costs they incur.108  
Indeed, while the nominal level of states’ entitlement is considerable (at a 
minimum Medicaid reimburses states for half of all federally recognized costs 
and in the case of poorer states and certain administrative services, the level of 
federal contribution is considerably higher), over the years states have done a 
remarkable job at manipulating the federal Medicaid contribution formula to 
create actual federal contribution levels far higher than the level to which they 
might therefore be entitled under the  nominal statutory formula.109  Therefore, 
while legal exposure may create a disincentive for state Medicaid programs, it 
is offset by the extensive reimbursement for medical assistance they receive. 
B. Trends in Coverage and Expenditures 
While it is possible to gain a technical understanding of Medicaid through 
a legal overview, for broad policy analysis purposes examination of Medicaid 
recipient and expenditure data is essential to understanding program trends and 
identifying major and emerging policy issues.  Therefore, this section of the 
article examines Medicaid statistics.  Unless otherwise noted, all of the data 
presented has been prepared for the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the 
Uninsured110 and employs a variety of governmental data sources.  Data on 
Medicaid coverage and expenditures are from 1997, the latest year for which 
final statistics on coverage and expenditures were available as of the summer 
of 2000. 
 
 107. A complete review of all Medicaid litigation would be so vast that it lies well beyond the 
scope of this article.  Individuals interested in gaining a clearer sense of the level of litigation that 
has transpired need only examine the United States Code Annotated.  Readers may wish to visit 
the website of the National Health Law Program, at http://www.healthlaw.org, which specializes 
among other matters in Medicaid legal advocacy. 
 108. Social Security Act § 1903(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (1994). 
 109. For a particularly clever state federal contribution strategy that has resulted in the 
payment of billions of dollars in federal Medicaid funding beyond the amount nominally 
specified under the statutory formula, see Letter from Timothy M. Westmoreland, Director, 
Center for Medicaid and State Operations, to State Medicaid Director 1 (July 26, 2000) 
(regarding states “upper payment limit” activities) at http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/ 
smd72600.htm.  Proposed rules to stop this practice were promulgated in October 2000.  65 Fed. 
Reg. 60,151 (Oct. 10, 2000). 
 110. See generally THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, at 
http://www.kff.org. 
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As noted previously, Medicaid law contains more than fifty separate 
eligibility groups.111 Nonetheless, for health services research and policy 
analysis purposes, these groupings can be collapsed into four “macro” 
categories: children; non-disabled, non-elderly adults; persons with disabilities; 
and the elderly.  Within these four groupings, a further broad distinction can be 
made between those who receive both Medicaid and cash welfare assistance, 
and those who do not receive cash assistance.  This collapsing of eligibility 
groupings creates certain anomalies (for example, disabled children are 
grouped within the disabled persons category rather than within the children’s 
category).  However, experts do not consider these peculiarities to adversely 
affect the accuracy of broad policy analysis. 
Medicaid data tell policy makers much about the program.  First and 
foremost, children dominate Medicaid;112 in 1997, children accounted for fifty-
two percent of all beneficiaries.113  Non-disabled, non-elderly adults accounted 
for twenty-one percent of program beneficiaries,114 while disabled, non-elderly 
persons accounted for seventeen percent of enrollees.115  The elderly 
comprised ten percent of all program beneficiaries.116  The predominance of 
children in the program is a testament to childhood poverty in America; in 
1996 nearly twenty percent of all American children were poor.117 
While children comprise the majority of beneficiaries, Figure 3 shows that 
between 1990 and 1997, the number of Medicaid-enrolled children actually 
declined slightly, as did the number of non-disabled, non-elderly adults.118  
Figure 4 shows that between 1995 and 1997, enrollment for children and adults 
dropped by 1.4% and 5.4% respectively after growing significantly during the 
first part of the decade.119  The number of elderly enrollees grew and then 
stabilized, while the number of persons with disabilities showed growth 
throughout this time period.120 
 
 
 
 
 
 111. See MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 7, at 3. 
 112. See infra Figure 8. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id.  Because poor adults are not recognized as an independent eligibility category under 
federal law, one can presume that these adults are overwhelmingly pregnant women or caretakers 
of children. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. In 1996 the figure stood at 19.8%.  ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, KIDS COUNT DATA 
BOOK 22 (1998). 
 118. See infra Figure 3. 
 119. See infra Figure 4. 
 120. Id. 
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The seeds of decline in Medicaid coverage of children and non-disabled 
adults probably began as a result of federally supported welfare reform 
experiments begun by the Clinton Administration in 1993, which introduced 
time limits and enhanced work requirements into the AFDC program.121 With 
 
 121. See Figure 4. 
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the enactment of federal welfare reform legislation in 1996, this decline may 
have actually increased, since the new legislation permitted far more 
aggressive efforts to terminate welfare and prevent enrollment than those 
sanctioned by the Administration as part of its earlier demonstrations.122  As 
women and children were removed from welfare rolls, state welfare agencies 
(which as noted administer the eligibility component of Medicaid as a matter 
of federal law) failed to draw a distinction between welfare eligibility (which 
ended) and Medicaid eligibility (which continued).123 
The growth in the number of persons with disabilities in the early part of 
the decade can be attributed to an expansion of coverage for disabled 
children,124 as well as more aggressive efforts on the part of states to design 
home and community service programs for persons with disabilities.125  The 
continued growth in the latter part of the decade probably is a result of a 
continuation of these factors, as well as greater awareness of the availability of 
Medicaid for persons with disabilities. 
Depending on the regulation sub-group, the importance of Medicaid varies 
significantly by population sub-category.  In 1997, forty-four percent of all 
poor persons (i.e., individuals with family incomes below the federal poverty 
level) were enrolled in Medicaid; among the near poor the number dropped to 
sixteen percent.126  Medicaid is of profound importance to American 
pediatrics.  As noted, children comprise the largest single group of 
beneficiaries;127 furthermore, in 1997 more than twenty percent of all 
American children received Medicaid.128 The program is twice as important for 
women as men (nine percent of all women received Medicaid in 1997 
compared with five percent of men).129  This greater level of enrollment is 
 
 122. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, §§ 701-42, 
801-16, 110 Stat. 2287-2318 (1996). 
 123. The Law of Unintended Consequences, supra note 44. 
 124. This expansion undoubtedly came to a halt with the enactment of the 1996 welfare 
reform legislation, which, among other provisions, sharply curtailed coverage for children with 
mental and developmental disabilities.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Sullivan v. Zebley, 
which overturned the standards and procedures used by the federal government to determine 
children’s eligibility for SSI, resulted in an overhaul of eligibility criteria that had its greatest 
impact on children with mental and developmental conditions. 493 U.S. 521 (1990).  In 1996, 
federal legislation expressly reversed Zebley.  Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, tit. I, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). 
 125. As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead v. L.C., this expansion may 
continue as states attempt to remove institutional bias from their state health programs through 
restructured Medicaid programs that emphasize the eligibility of persons with disabilities for 
services in the community.  Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
 126. The 1997 poverty level for a family of three was $13,300. 
 127. See supra Figure 3. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See infra Figure 16. 
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undoubtedly a result of women’s higher poverty rates, the existence of female-
specific eligibility categories (i.e., pregnancy), and the fact that women are 
more likely to show up as caretaker relatives of children in poor households.130 
Minority Americans are also disproportionately likely to be enrolled in 
Medicaid.131 In 1997, twenty-two percent of all African Americans, and 
nineteen percent of all Hispanic and Native Americans were enrolled in 
Medicaid, compared with eight percent of white Americans.132  Studies suggest 
that adults with activity limitations are nearly seven times as likely as those 
without limitations to be enrolled in Medicaid.133  Finally, while fourteen 
percent of all Medicare beneficiaries receive Medicaid,134 when disabled 
beneficiaries are considered separately, this figure skyrockets to thirty-six 
percent.135 
As noted, states have considerable power over Medicaid eligibility levels. 
The state role in establishing Medicaid eligibility is underscored by data on 
state-level variation in eligibility.  Figure 5 shows that during the 1996-1998 
time period, twelve states maintained sufficiently restrictive eligibility 
standards to maintain coverage at under eight percent of their state populations, 
while fourteen states covered more than 12.5% of their populations.136 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Dennis McCarty & Helen Levine, Needs of People with Chronic and Disabling 
Conditions, in ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: PROMISES AND PROSPECTS FOR LOW-INCOME 
AMERICANS 61, 66 (Marsha Lillie-Blanton et al. eds., 1999). 
 134. See The Law of Unintended Consequences, supra note 44. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
>12.5% (14 states*)
9.6% to 12.5% (16 states)
8.0% to 9.5% (8 states)
<8.0% (13 states)
Percent of Nonelderly Population Covered
by Medicaid, by State, 1996-1998
Figure 5
* Includes the District of Columbia.
SOURCE: Urban Institute estimates based on pooled March 1997, 1998,
and 1999 Current Population Surveys, prepared for the Kaiser
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured.  
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The impact of the 1996 welfare reform legislation can be seen in the 
declining proportion of Medicaid enrollees who receive cash assistance.137  
Figure 6 shows that the proportion of Medicaid enrollees who also receive cash 
assistance fell from sixty-seven percent in 1990 to fifty percent in 1997.138  
These declines occur even among individuals who, following the loss of cash 
assistance, remain eligible for Medicaid.139  Figure 7 shows the impact of the 
loss of welfare on Medicaid enrollment.140  Within a year of leaving cash 
assistance, only fifty percent of children retain Medicaid (even though virtually 
all remain entitled to coverage as low income children), while Medicaid 
enrollment drops to thirty-six percent in the case of women despite their 
eligibility for transitional benefits.141  Figure 7 also underscores that former 
welfare recipients do not substitute private insurance for Medicaid.142  Only 
twenty-seven percent of children and only twenty-three percent of women 
were privately insured at the end of the time period in question.143 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 137. See Figure 6. 
 138. Id. 
 139. The Law of Unintended Consequences, supra note 44. 
 140. See infra Figure 7. 
 141. The Law of Unintended Consequences, supra note 44. 
 142. See infra Figure 7. 
 143. Id. 
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In sum, data on Medicaid enrollment shows a high dependence on the 
program among the poor, persons with disabilities, members of racial and 
ethnic minority groups, and children and women of childbearing age,144 who 
otherwise would be without access to health insurance.145  Women and 
children appear to be experiencing a decline in enrollment owing to the advent 
of welfare reform and states’ failure to implement aggressive outreach and 
case-finding efforts or formal procedures for ensuring the retention of 
Medicaid coverage during the welfare disenrollment process.146  While the 
Health Care Financing Administration has taken action to require states to put 
safeguards into place, these efforts occurred only years after large-scale 
disenrollment had begun147 and prospects for finding and re-enrolling the 
thousands of women and children who incorrectly lost benefits are limited at 
best.148 
The enrollment data underscore Medicaid’s significant and growing role 
for persons with disabilities, among whom enrollment has shown steady 
increases throughout the decade.149  Underlying factors include greater levels 
of state investment in the provision of home and community services for 
 
 144. See supra Figures 2, 3 and 7. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See supra Figures 2, 3, 4 and 7. 
 147. Westmoreland, supra note 109. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See supra Figure 3. 
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persons with serious disabilities, as well as changes in eligibility criteria that 
have resulted in enhanced coverage levels.150 
1. Expenditures by population sub-group 
Spending by population sub-group is an important means for gauging the 
relative and absolute importance of the program where different sub-
populations are concerned.  Figure 8  shows the difference between enrollment 
and expenditures.  In 1997, although non-disabled adults and children 
comprised nearly seventy-five percent of program beneficiaries, they 
accounted for only twenty-five percent of program spending.151  Sixty-five 
percent of all program expenditures were made for elderly and disabled 
individuals who together accounted for only slightly more than one quarter of 
all enrollees.152  Figure 9 presents an alternative means of looking at 
expenditures. This figure shows that in 1997, only one quarter of all Medicaid 
expenditures could be attributed to  “acute care” services (i.e., services other 
than long-term care) for families.153  Thus, of the $161 billion in Medicaid 
spending that year, only one quarter is in fact associated with the types of 
expenditures that one might find under a standard commercial insurance plan 
for working age adults and their children.154  The vast majority of program 
spending was made on behalf of populations who overwhelmingly exist 
outside of the conventional insurance market and where needs would in 
significant measure be considered uninsurable.155 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 150. See, e.g., Social Security Act § 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (a)(10)(A)(ii) (1994 
& Supp. III 1997). 
 151. See Figure 8. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See infra Figure 9. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
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Figure 10 shows the growth in expenditure by population group between 
1990 and 1997.  While spending on children and non-disabled adults grew 
slightly over this time period, spending on persons with disabilities increased 
dramatically.156  These figures are consistent with those related to enrollment 
growth and show Medicaid’s growing importance for this population. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 156. See Figure 10. 
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The significance of Medicaid expenditure figures for persons with 
disabilities is further heightened by statistics that disaggregate these 
expenditures into their acute and long-term components for each population 
sub-group, as illustrated by Figure 11.157  The pattern that emerges for 
beneficiaries with disabilities is extremely important to understand.  When 
acute and long-term spending are separated, it becomes evident that, perhaps 
contrary to popular expectations, the majority of the more than $8,000 in 
annual expenditures for this population in 1997 were for acute care services 
(e.g., outpatient care, community services, prescribed drugs), rather than 
institutional long-term care.158  It is also possible to see the very high average 
annual cost of acute care spending for persons with disabilities, with 
expenditures levels that vastly exceed those that would be anticipated under a 
standard commercial policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 This high level of acute care spending on persons with disabilities 
underscores the shift in care and services away from institutional settings and 
toward community services.  It also is a strong indicator of just how far beyond 
the conventional insurance market beneficiaries with disabilities lie.  This 
figure suggests the limited potential for applying “market” strategies to 
improve coverage of persons with disabilities.159 
 
 157. See Figure 11. 
 158. Were it not for the fact that Medicare is the first payer for dually eligible beneficiaries, 
this same pattern also undoubtedly would have been in evidence for the elderly. 
 159. In theory, applying risk adjustment principles to insurance premiums (i.e., paying more 
for certain enrollees based on health status) might be a means of better matching premium 
revenues to health care spending expectations. However, the current science of risk adjustment 
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2. Expenditures by service type 
In addition to considering Medicaid’s relative importance for specific 
population sub-groups, policy analysts also examine expenditures for different 
classes of services.  Figure 12 shows Medicaid expenditures by service type.  
In 1997, more than one third of all program spending entailed the purchase of 
long-term care services (i.e., home health care, mental health services, the 
services of intermediate care facilities for persons with mental retardation and 
related conditions, and nursing facility services).160  Figure 13 illustrates 
Medicaid’s extraordinary role in the case of long-term care.  In 1997, Medicaid 
accounted for thirty-eight percent of all long-term care expenditures among all 
payers and forty-seven percent of all expenditures for nursing home care.161  
The long-term care system is effectively dependent on Medicaid (and to a 
lesser extent Medicare).162 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
appears to be sufficiently under-developed at this point in time to prevent this approach from 
being feasible. 
 160. See Figure 12. 
 161. See infra Figure 13. 
 162. Id. 
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Finally, Medicaid’s major role in the support of the safety net can be seen 
in Figure 14, which compares Medicaid patients as a percentage of total 
patients for primary physician practices and practices of federally supported 
community health centers, which furnish comprehensive primary health 
services to low income and medically underserved communities.163  Figure 14 
shows that in a standard physician practice, Medicaid comprises nine percent 
of all patients served.164  In the case of health centers, Medicaid patients 
account for thirty-four percent of all patients.165  Revenue numbers are 
consistent with patient load: in 1997, Medicaid accounted for more than one 
third of all health center revenues.166 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 163. See infra Figure 14. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, 
HEALTH CENTERS’ ROLE AS SAFETY NET PROVIDERS FOR MEDICAID PATIENTS AND THE 
UNINSURED 13 (2000), available at http://www.kff.org. 
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In sum, Medicaid program expenditure data demonstrate the extraordinary 
level of dependence among various sub-population groups on the program in 
both absolute and relative dollar levels.  Medicaid spending on elderly persons 
and persons with disabilities is extremely high on a per capita basis.  These 
high spending levels, particularly in the case of persons with disabilities, 
reflect high levels of expenditures not only for long-term care services but for 
acute care services as well, in amounts that extend well beyond those levels 
that would be anticipated under conventional insurance.  Expenditures on 
working age adults and children are low and account for a minority of total 
program spending, yet as the enrollment data suggest, these populations are 
extremely reliant on the program to meet their insurance needs.167 
The expenditure data also underscore the central role that Medicaid plays 
in the nation’s long-term care system, accounting for the largest single share of 
overall national spending.168  In the absence of any other third party financing 
mechanism, Medicaid has filled the financial void where both institutional and 
community-based long-term care services are concerned.  Were Medicaid to 
disappear, not only would millions of individuals be left without coverage but 
the long-term care system in the United States would virtually collapse. 
Similarly, in light of Medicaid’s role as an underwriter of safety net 
providers (i.e., health care providers that treat high volumes of both uninsured 
and Medicaid-sponsored patients such as public hospitals, health centers, and 
 
 167. See supra Figure 8. 
 168. See supra Figure 13. 
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public health agencies), the loss of Medicaid funds could be expected to 
significantly adversely affect the ability of the safety net to absorb growing 
numbers of uninsured patients.  As Figure 15 shows, between 1990 and 1997, 
when the number of uninsured Americans grew by twenty-three percent, the 
number of uninsured patients served by health centers grew by fifty percent.169  
Much of this capacity within health centers to absorb so many uninsured 
patients can be attributed to a significant increase in overall revenues, fueled 
by broader Medicaid coverage and better Medicaid rates paid to health centers 
over the decade.170 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. MODERNIZING MEDICAID: MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR 
REFORM 
Despite Medicaid’s enormous role in the modern health system, the 
program suffers from a series of major problems tied to its basic federal design 
compounded by federal and state administrative choices over the years.  Over 
the course of three and a half decades, legislative changes have been heaped on 
changes (sometimes with duplicative or contradictory results).171  The result is 
 
 169. ROSENBAUM, supra note 166, at 11.  See also Figure 15. 
 170. DANIEL R. HAWKINS JR. & SARA ROSENBAUM, The Challenges Facing Health Centers 
in a Changing Healthcare System, in THE FUTURE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM: WHO WILL CARE 
FOR THE POOR AND UNINSURED? 99 (Stuart H. Altman et al. eds., 1998). 
 171. For example, the optional categorically needy children whose coverage was added to 
Medicaid in 1997 as part of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) legislation 
already could be covered as optional categorically needy children under §1902(r)(2) of the Act, 
which had been added a decade earlier.  SARA ROSENBAUM & COLLEEN SONOSKY, THE URBAN 
INSTITUTE, CHILD HEALTH IN A CHANGING POLICY ENVIRONMENT: THE ROLES OF CHILD 
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a horribly complicated law that leaves out nearly as many poor people as it 
covers, makes coverage of the near-poor feasible but only on terms that most 
states reject (very broad eligibility and no cost-sharing), supports coverage of 
long-term care services but with significant lapses in the adequacy of that 
coverage and the ability to furnish coverage in community settings, and 
underwrites the safety net through antiquated payment mechanisms that no 
longer work as they should in the modern health care environment. The 
question thus becomes Medicaid’s prospects for reform. 
For a number of reasons, in the absence of comprehensive national reform, 
a strong case can be made for the systematic and thoughtful modernization of 
Medicaid.  First, the process already has begun.  As this article points out, over 
the past decade, Medicaid has been altered in certain basic respects to take into 
account the needs and pressures created by the modern health system and 
emerging health needs.  Eligibility standards were revised as part of the 1996 
welfare reform legislation to make possible the coverage of all families with 
children on the basis of financial need alone (as defined by the states), without 
regard to welfare receipt or categorical relationship to the AFDC program.172 
This reform, which states have begun to use, permits a federally assisted 
response to the problem of the working uninsured, which is concentrated in 
lower income working families (i.e., families with incomes at or below two-
hundred percent of the federal poverty level).173  As Figure 16 illustrates, in 
1998 more than three-quarters of uninsured non-elderly Americans were 
members of working households, and more than half of these individuals were 
members of families with incomes at or below two-hundred percent of the 
federal poverty level.174  It is unlikely that these families will be able to secure 
access to employer-sponsored coverage; indeed, firms that offer no coverage 
employ the majority of uninsured workers.175 In the absence of an alternative 
 
ADVOCACY ORGANIZATIONS IN ADDRESSING POLICY ISSUES (1999).  In federal Medicaid 
policy, duplication is a serious problem, since under the federal budget process, each addition to 
Medicaid results in financial obligations which must be paid for through tax increases or 
offsetting program reductions. 
 172. See The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act § 103, 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. III. 1997)).  The Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act was the repeal of AFDC and replaced it with Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families.  Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2210 (1996). 
 173. KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, UNINSURED IN AMERICA 11 
(2000).  In 1998, when eighteen percent of all non-elderly persons were uninsured, thirty-six 
percent of the poor and thirty-one percent of the near-poor were uninsured. 
 174. See infra Figure 16. 
 175. ELLEN O’BRIEN & JUDY FEDER, THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE 
UNINSURED, HOW WELL DOES THE EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEM WORK 
FOR LOW-INCOME FAMILIES? (1998), available at http://www.kff.org/content/archive/ 
2107/lowincome3.html.  Only forty-three percent of low wage workers were even offered 
coverage by their employers in 1996, compared to ninety-three percent of higher wage workers.  
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source of affordable coverage, it is likely that many will remain uninsured, as 
the welfare transition statistics presented in the previous section suggest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The reform process also has grown for persons with disabilities.  
Legislation enacted in 1999 further extends existing provisions of law that 
permit states to provide Medicaid to persons with severe disabilities who, if 
they were to return to work, would risk the loss of coverage or who, in the 
absence of Medicaid coverage, would be unable to work.176  These expanded 
benefits assist workers with disabilities in two ways.  First, because of the 
potential impact on insurance costs, employers might resist hiring individuals 
with disabilities or else may impose long waiting periods for benefits.  Second, 
persons with disabilities who believe that they can work, and wish to do so, 
nonetheless may fail to pursue employment opportunities in the absence of 
Medicaid benefit protections.  The 1999 reforms create additional incentives to 
work without fear of major health consequences and remove a possible barrier 
to employment. 
Reforms also have occurred in the context of the organization and 
administration of Medicaid.  Medicaid has been modernized over the past two 
 
Id. at fig.5.  As equally important, when offered coverage low-wage workers are surprisingly 
responsive to the offer, suggesting that employment-based health coverage is an extremely high 
priority.  Id. at fig. 6. 
 176. Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 § 201(a), Pub. L. No. 
106-170 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 26 U.S.C.). 
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decades in the area of managed care.  The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and its 
precursor managed care “waiver” program dating back to 1981,177 permit states 
to take their programs through the same fundamental type of managed care 
conversion that employer-sponsored coverage has undergone over the past two 
decades.178  It is now possible to establish both basic and specialty mandatory 
managed care programs for Medicaid beneficiaries, and many state agencies 
are highly sophisticated purchasers of complex managed care products.179 
A second reason to invest in the modernization of Medicaid has to do with 
its amenability to change and the existence of an administrative infrastructure 
to implement change.  Were Congress to initiate entirely new programs to 
address the problems identified in this article, a completely new infrastructure 
would have to be put into place, a process that would push the cost of reform 
up dramatically and add years to the implementation timetable. 
The most important reason to modernize Medicaid is that the program is an 
enormously expensive investment with vast promise but in need of a lot of 
attention.  Most pointedly, if Medicaid’s problems are not addressed, then 
ultimately one can expect to see greater efforts to bypass Medicaid altogether 
in an effort to address emerging health issues.  This already has happened 
once, with the 1997 enactment of the State Children’s Health Insurance Plan 
(SCHIP).180 The SCHIP program can be operated as either a part of Medicaid 
or else as a separate block grant program that contains nominal federal 
standards and virtually no federal beneficiary protections.181  Even more 
significantly perhaps, SCHIP is utterly duplicative of Medicaid in its most 
fundamental respects, thereby underscoring the fact that, rather than being an 
affirmative addition to the pantheon of federal interventions to emerging public 
health problems, SCHIP is a “non-Medicaid” law that creates a legal 
mechanism for bypassing the requirements and safeguards of the Medicaid 
statute.182  All the children whom SCHIP makes eligible could already be 
covered under an expanded Medicaid. 183  The services SCHIP supports are 
 
 177. Social Security Act § 1915(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(b) (1994). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Sara Rosenbaum, Approaches to Assuring Quality Health Care Through State Contracts 
with Managed Care Plans, in ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 223, 234 (Marsha Lillie-Blanton et al. 
eds., 1999). 
 180. 42 U.S.C. § 1397. 
 181. Sara Rosenbaum et. al., The Children’s Hour: The State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program, HEALTH AFF., May-June 1998, at 75. 
 182. The price that states paid for this flexibility was a capped federal financial contribution 
of $40 billion over ten years, a price that they presumably might be less willing to pay in the case 
of the $100 billion per year Medicaid program. 
 183. SCHIP makes “targeted low-income” children eligible for assistance.  Social Security 
Act § 2110(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1397jj(a) (Supp. IV 1998).  Under freestanding SCHIP programs, 
these are children who are ineligible for Medicaid and whose family incomes are at or below 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
42 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45:7 
federally recognized services under Medicaid.  Already there have been calls at 
the highest levels184 to continue this path of duplicative health care spending 
by expanding SCHIP to cover parents.185  As with the children, parents of low-
income children already can be covered under Medicaid. 
What explains the enactment of SCHIP?  At its core, SCHIP reflects a 
desire on the part of Congress not to create new entitlement programs.186  
However, the bigger question is why Congress created a new program rather 
than modify Medicaid for the near poor.  The answer lies in the fact that most 
federal lawmakers, simply refused at the time and under the hurried 
circumstances in which SCHIP was enacted, to address the deep structural 
issues that must be dealt with in order to Medicaid to the near-poor.  State 
officials concluded that since the children targeted for assistance were near-
poor, their families could afford modest cost-sharing; furthermore, since the 
program was designed to create a proxy for employer coverage,187 the benefit 
package should be more limited than the extensive coverage available to the 
poorest children under Medicaid.  Neither of these options—using modest cost 
sharing or offering a streamlined benefit package—is possible under the 
traditional Medicaid program. 
Whatever one’s view of Medicaid for the poor, these concerns about 
Medicaid coverage of the near poor are legitimate, yet the issue was never 
debated.  As a result, lawmakers opted for a duplicative new program rather 
than to rethink certain basic aspects of Medicaid.188 
Rather than spawning more SCHIP substitutes that not only diminish 
protections for vulnerable populations but also entail duplicative governmental 
spending,189 the wiser course may be to thoughtfully attempt Medicaid 
 
twice the federal poverty level. Social Security Act § 2110(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1397jj(b) (Supp. IV 
1998). 
 184. President Clinton proposed a SCHIP expansion in the fiscal year 2001 budget and Vice 
President Gore proposed SCHIP expansions as part of his Presidential campaign. 
 185. Id. 
 186. SARA ROSENBAUM & COLLEEN SONOSKY, URBAN INSTITUTE, CHILD HEALTH IN A 
CHANGING POLICY ENVIRONMENT: THE ROLES OF CHILD ADVOCACY ORGANIZATIONS IN 
ADDRESSING POLICY ISSUES (1999). 
 187. The SCHIP statute even speaks in terms of “benchmark coverage” which is to be 
calibrated under SCHIP programs to one of several alternative employer-sponsored benefit plans. 
Social Security Act § 2103(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1397cc (Supp. IV 1998). 
 188. Added to the philosophical resistance to Medicaid reform, one of two prime sponsors of 
SCHIP was Senator Edward Kennedy, who is not a member of the Senate Finance Committee, 
which has jurisdiction over Medicaid.  He thus had limited interest in introducing a bill that his 
committee (the Senate Labor Committee) could not consider.  See generally 
http://www.senate.gov (listing all members of the United States Senate Committees). 
 189. Because each new initiative must be paid for under the Federal Budget Act, the fact that 
Medicaid already includes these potential expenditures in its budgetary “baseline” does not mean 
that the Congressional Budget Office would recognize possible Medicaid savings as a cost offset 
to new outlays under a separate SCHIP program.  Thus, Congress effectively paid twice for 
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restructuring.  Rather than letting a nearly two-hundred billion dollar program 
continue to lurch along under the accumulated burdens of thirty-five years of 
policy “wear and tear,” there ought to be a real effort at program reform. 
The areas that cry out for repair span the entire program, and the list of 
items that need attention is long.  But the essential thing to remember is that 
while addressing these matters is complicated, Medicaid is a program of 
demonstrated resilience, and none of the issues raised here is beyond 
thoughtful attention and reform. 
A logical place to start the Medicaid “litany of horrors” is with eligibility.  
The program’s basic financial eligibility levels are extremely restrictive; 
furthermore, because they are absolute, they create a steep “cliff” effect and 
thus represent enormously regressive social policy.  In the case of categorically 
needy persons (virtually all of the expansion groups discussed in this article 
fall into this classification), the fixed financial standards mean that individuals 
qualify or do not qualify.  With very limited exceptions, there is no income-
related premium option under Medicaid, nor are there sufficient flexible cost-
sharing options for near-poor families and individuals that would help states 
maintain some control over program costs.  While care must be taken in the 
design of premiums and cost sharing in order to avoid creating of barriers to 
coverage of lower income plans,190 modest premium contributions and cost 
sharing would appear to be preferable to no coverage at all. 
Not only are the financial eligibility levels low in relation to need, but the 
standards and methodologies used to evaluate income and resources, determine 
family size, and make other financial adjustments necessary to the 
determination of financial eligibility are frightfully complex.  They create an 
unnecessarily heavy administrative burden on state and local agencies and 
above all, on applicants and recipients.  Additionally, they vastly increase the 
potential for erroneous denials and major delays in assistance.  Anyone who 
has spent even a scintilla of time around the Medicaid program probably 
believes that were administration made simpler, more people could be assisted 
for roughly the same amount of money. 
One logical response might be to permit states to adopt more generous 
financial eligibility standards for all populations that at the same time permit 
the use of income related premiums and modest cost sharing in the case of 
 
SCHIP: once in the new tax revenues that were needed to support the program (in the case of 
SCHIP, a tobacco tax was used) and once in the form of a Medicaid expenditure baseline that 
already allowed for these outlays. 
 190. There is a sizable body of literature on cost-sharing and its effects on the poor that 
suggests that cost sharing beyond modest levels acts as a strong deterrent to enrollment.  
Nonetheless, some cost sharing undoubtedly is feasible.  SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., CHIP 
HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS AND COST SHARING: LESSONS FROM THE LITERATURE (1998).  
See also SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., AN ANALYSIS OF IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES RELATING TO 
CHIP COST SHARING PROVISIONS FOR CERTAIN TARGETED LOW INCOME CHILDREN (1999). 
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near-poor individuals and families.  Another option would be to allow states to 
measure eligibility in accordance with simplified methodologies that lend 
themselves to short applications, a limited amount of personal information, and 
quick and accurate calculations.  Also essential are annual enrollment 
periods,191 so that Medicaid coverage is stabilized and the need for frequent 
eligibility reviews is eliminated.192  The annual enrollment concept, which was 
introduced into the statute for children in 1997,193 is more consistent with the 
notion of Medicaid as insurance rather than welfare.  With simpler 
methodologies, states could be expected to take far more aggressive steps to 
design enrollment systems that are accessible in communities and that avoid 
using welfare offices.  Even if welfare offices were to remain responsible for 
the final “stamp of approval,” their role as the site of application for assistance 
should be ended. 
Beyond the financial eligibility problems lie the categorical eligibility 
problems.  To begin with, there is no federal coverage category for non-
disabled working age adults without children, a problem that has plagued states 
for years.  The statute cries out for the addition of an optional coverage 
category that would recognize adults who are neither elderly, persons with 
disabilities, or parents.  The data on the working uninsured and the reality of 
limited employer participation in insurance plans when the workforce is 
predominantly low income more than justify this response. 
The bar to categorical eligibility in the case of non-disabled adults is by no 
means the only problem.  Persons with disabilities face serious problems of 
their own that are increasingly coming to light in the wake of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Olmstead v. L.C.,194 which declared the unnecessary 
institutionalization of persons with disabilities a form of discrimination under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act.195  Given the importance of Medicaid in 
financing long-term care, states naturally have begun to reconsider how their 
Medicaid programs will need to be amended or revised to promote greater 
availability of community services.  Under existing Medicaid law, states can 
offer expanded services and benefits using liberalized eligibility standards for 
institutionalized persons as well as for persons who, but for these services, 
would require institutional services covered under the state plan.196  However, 
 
 191. Under federal law, eligibility must be redetermined whenever personal circumstances 
change, thereby leading many states to adopt short periods of coverage and frequent 
redetermination cycles.  42 C.F.R. § 435.916(c) (1999). 
 192. The statute already permits twelve months continuous enrollment in the case of children, 
an option to which many states have responded.  Social Security Act § 1902(e)(12), 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(e)(12) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
 195. Id. at 600. 
 196. Social Security Act § 1915(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) (1994). 
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this test creates two problems.  First, persons with physical disabilities either 
must go into an institution or be on the verge of doing so before they can 
qualify for an alternative program.197  States would have to literally expand 
their institutional coverage standards in order to qualify more persons for 
community services, a step that few officials want to take.  Second, persons 
with mental illnesses are completely unaided by this standard, since Medicaid 
excludes coverage for individuals with mental diseases.  As a result, persons 
with mental illnesses cannot meet a test that requires that they demonstrate that 
they would reside in a Medicaid covered institution without broader 
community care. 
A possible option would be to allow states to set liberalized eligibility 
standards for persons with disabilities who reside in communities.  Costs could 
be controlled through the use of case planning and active care management.  
The elimination of a risk of institutionalization test would not only expand 
options for aiding persons with physical disabilities but would also make 
assistance more readily available to those with mental disabilities.  
Furthermore, this change would appear to be enormously important in light of 
the Olmstead decision, in order to minimize the potential for institutional bias 
in Medicaid. 
Medicaid’s extraordinary benefit package creates problems of its own.  
One of the great strengths of Medicaid is its benefit structure. At the same 
time, as it is currently configured, the benefit package has major drawbacks for 
states that engage in large-scale managed care purchasing.  Under law, all 
categorically needy persons are entitled to all benefits with either nominal or 
no cost sharing.  While the scope of the entitlement is vital to the program’s 
mission, it makes managed care purchasing and administration difficult, 
because it extends so far beyond the scope of conventional managed care 
products.  Consequently, as states have begun to purchase managed care 
products, it is clear that virtually no vendors sell products as broad as Medicaid 
coverages either requires or permits.  States have pursued a logical tactic of 
effectively breaking up their state plans into two components: one consisting of 
the managed care contract and the other consisting of residual benefits that 
remain directly administered by the state.198  The result has been a hodgepodge 
of state managed care agreements that vary enormously in what lies “inside” 
the agreement and what lies “outside” the scope of the contract and, thus 
remains a direct responsibility of the state agency. 
While it is probably not possible to arrive at a single standard plan and 
supplemental coverage arrangement under Medicaid that would fit all state 
 
 197. This is the practical import of the statutory test under § 1915(c) of the Social Security 
Act.  42 U.S.C. § 1396n (1994). 
 198. SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., NEGOTIATING THE NEW HEALTH SYSTEM: A NATIONWIDE 
STUDY OF MEDICAID MANAGED CARE CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1999). 
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needs, it might be possible to devise several different basic and supplemental 
coverage packages, much like “standard” and “high option” health plans in the 
private sector.  States that wished to contract with managed care vendors could 
buy a standard package of primary, preventive, acute, and limited long-term 
services for enrollees, while state agencies, in their insurer roles, would retain 
direct responsibility for “high option” services (i.e., the remainder of the 
Medicaid entitlement). Those vendors who can demonstrate added capabilities 
in the provision and management of persons with long-term health service 
needs could expand their contracts to include some or all of these residual 
“high option” services.  At the same time, the separation of the Medicaid 
entitlement into its two basic coverage components (acute and long-term) 
might help encourage the emergence of a more stable, better priced, national 
Medicaid market that in turn would yield more products, better pricing 
techniques (including tiered pricing for special populations), greater ability to 
develop common data systems, and mechanisms for measuring and achieving 
quality improvement. 
An additional problem that would require statutory restructuring is the 
issue of aid to low income Medicare beneficiaries.  Under federal law, 
Medicare recipients with low incomes who do not qualify for Medicaid receive 
premium and cost sharing assistance only.199  Pending Medicare drug reform 
proposals would extend additional coverage for prescribed drugs as well.200  
An additional policy option would be to extend to low income Medicare 
beneficiaries coverage for other necessary services and benefits excluded from 
Medicare, particularly hearing aids and eyeglasses.  If Medicare is not 
expanded to cover prescribed drugs, then Medicaid coverage extension to all 
lower income Medicare beneficiaries becomes particularly important. 
The problem of managed care pricing puts a spotlight on providers 
generally.  Since Medicaid’s inception, one of its greatest problems has been 
low participation by private providers, a situation fueled at least in part by low 
payment levels.  While it is not at all clear that better rates would bring a 
multitude of providers into the program, payment reforms fashioned after those 
used in Medicare and designed to bring Medicaid payments up to at least 
Medicare levels might create at least modest program participation incentives, 
particularly as eligibility expands. 
It is also clear that in light of continuing high levels of uninsurance, it is 
important to address the needs of safety net providers.  Federally funded 
community health centers, public hospitals, and local public health agencies 
that furnish medical care are facing a huge rise in the number of uninsured 
 
 199. See supra text accompanying note 63. 
 200. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE FOR 
MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES: A SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF SELECTED PROPOSALS (2000), 
available at http://www.kff.org. 
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patients they treat.  As noted previously, between 1990 and 1997, the 
proportion of uninsured patients treated at health centers rose at a rate twice 
that for the non-elderly uninsured population as a whole.201 While Medicaid 
typically pays steeply discounted rates to health providers,202 Medicaid’s 
disproportionate share (“DSH”) payment policy for high volume indigent care 
hospitals and the cost-related payment policy for health centers have at least in 
theory averted the imposition of such steep discounts in the case of safety net 
providers which cannot absorb the impact of deeply discounted payments 
without cutting into other funds intended for care of the uninsured. 203  
Unfortunately, neither policy is working well.204 
In the case of DSH, the current formula is so loose that states can divert 
much of the DSH funding they receive to hospitals with modest indigent care 
burdens, leaving highly stressed facilities with only limited aid.  In the case of 
health centers, the cost based payment system if set to sunset in FY 2004205 
and many states have resisted adherence to the policy.206  Moreover, both 
health centers and public hospitals actively participate in managed care and, 
like other providers, have had to provide steep discounts to companies as a 
condition of network participation. Thus, the combination of these three 
factors—the rising number of uninsured, the effects of a competitive health 
system, and only limited relief under Medicaid’s special payment rules—have 
combined to create serious problems for the safety net.207 
One logical step might be creation of federalized Medicaid payment 
policies for safety net providers that offset managed care discounts and ensure 
that revenues meant for the care of the uninsured are not diverted into 
Medicaid revenue offsets.  A federally funded annual payment supplement 
could be allocated directly to institutions and clinics whose uninsured patient 
caseloads exceed specified minimum standards.  Another option would be to 
continue, expand, and refine the existing policy of mandatory state payment 
supplements to safety net institutions, although such an option probably would 
be the less attractive because of state resistance to federally mandated payment 
 
 201. See supra Figure 15. 
 202. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 7, at 20  (reporting that in 1989 Medicaid 
payments to physicians averaged 73.7% of Medicare payment rates). 
 203. See supra text accompanying notes 89-99.  For a comprehensive review of the problems 
that safety net providers face under Medicaid, see COMM. ON THE CHANGING MARKET, 
MANAGED CARE, AND THE FUTURE VIABILITY OF SAFETY NET PROVIDERS, INSTITUTE OF 
MEDICINE, AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE SAFETY NET: INTACT BUT ENDANGERED (Marion Ein 
Lewind & Stuart Altman eds., 2000) [hereinafter INTACT BUT ENDANGERED]. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(13)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (1994). 
 206. See, e.g., Letter from National Governor’s Association, to Congress (July 2000) 
(opposing continuation of special payment policies for federally qualified health centers). 
 207. INTACT BUT ENDANGERED, supra note 203, ch. 3.  For a synopsis of these findings see 
the Executive Summary.  Id. at 1. 
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levels.  The federal government has a history of providing financial support for 
the provision of health services in underserved communities;208 a federally 
administered system of direct payment supplements is consistent with this 
history and has been recommended by at least one national study.209 
A final issue that needs to be addressed is the federal/state allocation of 
financial responsibilities.  This issue has been debated in one form or another 
since Medicaid’s enactment. Currently the federal government bears 
approximately fifty-five percent of the financial responsibility for the 
program.210  The issue is whether this level of financial contribution should be 
increased, either by some percentage, or to a level needed to fully underwrite 
the cost of one or more aspects of the program.  Arguments for expanded 
federal financial role relate to the question of which part of government—the 
federal government or state governments—is in the best position to bear the 
burden of social welfare expenditures (in this case, health care) that rise more 
rapidly than the general inflation rate.  Given the limited ability of state 
governments to respond to rapid escalations in health costs, the most logical 
step might be to have the federal government assume responsibility for a 
significantly higher share of Medicaid program costs, while leaving states with 
reduced financial exposure but a sufficient investment to continue to play a 
partnering role in service delivery, program design, and quality improvement.  
This expanded federal financial role also might encourage states to support 
those restructuring costs that entail significant outlays. 
Beyond the issue of sorting out financial responsibilities, several other 
matters affect the prospects for resolution of these major Medicaid reform 
issues.  There are three major issues.  The first is finding the money and 
dealing with the federal budget process.  The second is addressing the 
ideological opposition to strengthening and modernizing an entitlement 
program.  The third is opposition to strengthening a direct government benefit 
program rather than using market solutions such as tax credits for the purchase 
of private insurance. 
The 1974 Budget Act imposes a series of conventions on Congressional 
deliberations of budgetary matters that fall with particular harshness on general 
 
 208. Examples of this tradition are the health centers program as well as other programs 
authorized and funded under the Public Health Service Act and Social Security Act, including the 
Title V Maternal and Child Health Services Block Grant, (Title V of the Social Security Act); the 
Ryan White Care Act (Title XXIII of the Public Health Service Act); and the National Health 
Service Corps (Title III of the Public Health Service Act). 
 209. INTACT BUT ENDANGERED, supra note 203. 
 210. The federal medical assistance percentage may not be less than fifty percent nor higher 
than eighty-three percent.  Social Security Act § 1903(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1396(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 
1998). 
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revenue entitlement programs such as Medicaid.211  Entitlement spending 
reforms cannot proceed unless paid for. This means that Congress must, as part 
of a budget resolution, approve significant new levels of Medicaid spending 
before debate on the matter can proceed and legislation can be enacted.  As of 
summer 2000, the projected federal surplus over the next ten years exceeded 
four trillion dollars.212  However, nearly half that amount would be dedicated 
to the Social Security system or debt reduction, and calls for tax relief, 
Medicare drug reform, and other national priorities may leave little money for 
other activities.213  It is impossible to say what the ten-year cost of the 
Medicaid reforms discussed in this article would amount to, but it is evident 
that the cost could be significant.  This is particularly true for reforms aimed at 
expanding and simplifying eligibility (the managed care-related benefit and 
safety net reforms probably would carry relatively minor price tags, because 
the reforms primarily involve restructuring the manner in which existing funds 
are spent). 
The second and third problems—opposition to entitlements and preference 
for tax solutions—are intertwined.  It is clearly the entitlement nature of the 
program that gives Medicaid its basic stature as “insurance.” The legal 
entitlement is what permits the Census Bureau to count recipients as “insured,” 
since the essence of insurance is the ability to enforce individual contractual 
expectations (or in this case, statutory entitlements).  Otherwise the benefits 
amount to simple largesse.214 
It is true that with entitlements come enforceable legal expectations (and 
ultimately lawsuits).  But this is no different from the legal expectations that 
privately insured individuals have.  Were one to count all of the insurance 
lawsuits ever brought, they would probably dwarf those brought under 
Medicaid.  The fact is, if the nation wants to “insure” people, then it needs to 
give individuals the legal tools they need to secure the services and benefits 
they are promised. 
 
 211. 2 U.S.C. § 900.  For a brief explanation of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, which 
tightened up on entitlement budgeting procedures and its “paygo” requirements (which  preclude 
expansion of direct spending programs such as Medicaid without identified sources of revenue), 
see http://www.usbr.gov/laws/bea.html. 
 212. Richard W. Stevenson,  Bush Tax Plan: The Debate Takes Shape, N.Y. TIMES, August 
26, 2000, at A1. 
 213. Id. 
 214. In that vein, we think that it is worth pointing out that it is not at all clear that children 
enrolled in freestanding SCHIP programs can be counted as insured or simply as recipients of 
subsidized health care, since as a matter of law the federal SCHIP statute specifies that it creates 
no individual entitlement.  The George Washington University Center for Health Services 
Research and Policy, which Professor Rosenbaum directs, is currently in the process of 
examining the legal documents for freestanding state SCHIP programs to determine whether they 
create enforceable legal rights under state law. 
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Furthermore, a tax credit is as much an entitlement as Medicaid.  
Extending tax credits to lower income individuals would create a tax 
entitlement.  In the case of health care, it is not at all clear that tax entitlements 
are less expensive.215  Furthermore, using the tax code as a mechanism for 
achieving better health coverage of lower income families and persons with 
disabilities creates additional problems.  Such an approach would leave 
beneficiaries without a program administration mechanism and would by 
definition rely on the market for millions of individuals who, as this article 
points out, either work for employers that do not participate in the health 
market or else fall outside of the market.  Finally, the issue of Medicaid versus 
tax credits may also be a distinction without a difference today, since in the 
case of working age adults and their children, so many states purchase 
managed care products. 
Some may see a problem of private insurance “crowd out”216 (that is, 
substituting public benefits for private benefits) in expanding Medicaid to 
cover greater numbers of working families.  This option already exists in 
Medicaid; the question is whether it should be expanded.  Furthermore, 
whether or not the “crowd-out” phenomenon is real (some research suggests 
that very little substitution actually occurs), the problem is no less present for 
tax expansions than is the case for direct expenditure reforms.217  Moreover, 
were government to provide the health coverage subsidy for lower income 
workers, employers that now subsidize coverage might in fact invest savings in 
greater levels of wages and compensation, a not unwelcome outcome. 
Finally, there are those who would object to Medicaid expansion on the 
ground that it stigmatizes the poor.  Despite concerns about the “stigma” of 
Medicaid, two recent studies suggest that the opposite may be true.218  When 
asked about Medicaid, lower income families consistently cite its value and 
desirability.219  Moreover, when the real barriers to Medicaid enrollment are 
explored in detail, at least one study suggests that the true problems lie in how 
states administer their programs, not how people view themselves for being 
enrolled in Medicaid.220 
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In the end, Medicaid reform is a matter of political consensus and will.  
The changes set forth in this article are modest in cost next to that which would 
form the establishment of an entirely new program were to be launched.  Each 
proposed reform is logical in that it builds on existing aspects of the program 
and could be enacted with relative ease. Given the importance of Medicaid for 
uninsurable populations and services, it is virtually impossible to conceive of 
the American health system without the program, unless vast new economic 
investments and extensive regulation of the private insurance market are 
adapted. These are most unlikely events.  Concerns about entitlement 
expansion, crowd-out, and government intrusion could just as easily be raised 
about tax proposals.  With respect to the concern about entitlements, there is 
little that can be done to avoid this problem if the goal of the reform exercise is 
insurance or its equivalent.  Whatever the outcome, it is evident that in the 
absence of a unified national system, the modernization of Medicaid will be a 
dominant theme in the next phase of health reform. 
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